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Introduction
In recent years, financial crises have been a common occurrence in emerging market
(and transition) countries with devastating consequences for their economies.  For example, the
financial crises that struck Mexico in 1994 and the East Asian countries in 1997 led to a fall in
the growth rate of GDP on the order of ten percentage points.  The financial crises in Russia
in 1998 and Ecuador in 1999 have had similar negative effects on real output.  Not only did
these crises lead to sharp increases in poverty, but to political instability as well.
Given the harmful effects and increased frequency of financial crises in emerging market
countries in recent years, a issue that is now high on the agenda of policymakers throughout the
world is the prevention  of these crises.  Specifically, what financial policies can help make
crises less likely?
This paper examines this question by first developing a framework for understanding
what a financial crisis is in emerging market countries and the dynamic process through which
these crises occur.  It then uses this framework to examine what particular  financial policies
may help to prevent financial crises.
2.
What is a Financial Crisis?
A  financial  system  performs  the  essential  function  of  channeling  funds  to  those
individuals or finns that have productive investment opportunities. To do this well, participants
in  financial markets  must  be  able to make  accurate judgements  about which  investment
opportunities are more or less creditworthy. Thus, a financial system must confront problems
of asymmetric information, in which one party to a financial contract has much less accurate
information than the other party. For example, borrowers who take out loans usually have better
information about the potential returns and risk associated with the investment projects they
plan to undertake than lenders do. Asymmetric information leads to two basic problems in the
financial system (and elsewhere): adverse selection and moral hazard.
Adverse selection occurs before the financial transaction takes place, when potential bad
credit risks are the ones who most actively seek out a loan. For example, those who want to take
Ion big risks are likely to be the most eager to take out a loan, even at a high rate of interest,
because they are less concerned with paying the loan back. Thus, the lender must be concerned
that the parties who are the most likely to produce an undesirable or adverse outcome are most
likely to be selected as borrowers.  Lenders may thus steer away from making loans at high
interest rates, because they know that they are not fully informed about the quality of borrowers,
and they fear that someone willing to borrow at a high interest rate is more likely to be a low-
quality borrower who is less likely to repay the loan. Lenders will try to tackle the problem of
asymmetric  information by  screening  out good  from bad  credit  risks.  But this  process  is
inevitably imperfect, and fear of adverse selection will lead lenders to reduce the quantity of
loans they might otherwise make.
Moral hazard occurs after the transaction takes place. It occurs because a borrower has
incentives to invest in projects with high risk in which the borrower does well if the project
succeeds, but  the lender bears  most  of the loss if the project  fails.  A borrower  also has
incentives to misallocate  funds for personal use, to  shirk and not  work very hard,  and  to
undertake investment in unprofitable projects  that serve only to increase personal power or
stature. Thus, a lender subjected to the hazard that the borrower has incentives to engage in
activities that are undesirable from the lender's point of view: that is, activities that make it less
likely  that  the loan will be paid back.  Lenders  do often impose  restrictions  (restrictive
covenants) on borrowers so that borrowers do not engage in behavior that makes it less likely
that they can pay back the loan. However, such restrictions are costly to enforce and monitor,
and inevitably somewhat limited in their reach. The potential conflict of interest between the
borrower and lender stemming from moral hazard again implies that many lenders will lend less
than they otherwise would, so that lending and investment will be at suboptimal levels.
The asymmetric information problems described above provides a definition of what a
financial crisis is:
A financial crisis is a disruption to financial markets in which adverse selection and
moral hazard problems become much worse, so that financial markets are unable to
efficiently  channel  funds  to  those  who  have  the  most  productive  investment
opportunities.
A financial crisis thus results in the inability of financial markets to function efficiently, which
leads to a sharp contraction in economic activity.
23.
Factors Promoting Financial  Crises
To flesh  out how a  financial crisis comes about and causes  a decline in  economic
activity, we need to examine the factors that promote financial crises and then go on to look at
how these factors interact dynamically to produce financial crises.
There  are four types of factors that can lead to increases in asymmetric information
problems and thus to a financial crisis: 1) deterioration of financial sector balance sheets, 2)
increases in interest rates,  3) increases in uncertainty, and  4) deterioration  of nonfinancial
balance sheets due to changes in asset prices.
3.1 Deterioration of Financial Sector Balance Sheets
The literature on asymmetric information and financial structure (see Gertler, 1988 and
Bernanke,  Gertler  and  Gilchrist,  1998  for  excellent  surveys),  explains  why  financial
intermediaries (commercial banks, thrift institutions, finance companies, insurance companies,
mutual funds and pension funds), play such an important role in the financial system.  They
have both the ability and the economic incentive to address asymmetric information problems.
For example, banks have an obvious ability to collect information at the time they consider
making a loan, and this ability is only increased when banks engage in long-term  customer
relationships and line of credit arrangements. In addition, their ability to scrutinize the checking
account balances of their borrowers provides banks with an additional advantage in monitoring
the borrowers' behavior.  Banks also have advantages in reducing moral hazard because, as
demonstrated by Diamond (1984), they can engage in lower cost monitoring than individuals,
and because, as pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), they have advantages in preventing
risk taking by borrowers since they can use the threat of cutting off lending in the future to
improve  a borrower's  behavior.  Banks'  natural  advantages  in collecting  information  and
reducing moral hazard  explain why banks have such an important role in financial markets
throughout the world.  Indeed, the greater difficulty of acquiring information on private firms
in emerging market countries explains why banks play a more important role in the financial
systems in emerging market countries than they do in industrialized countries (Rojas-Suarez and
Weisbrod, 1994).
Banks (and other financial intermediaries) have an incentive to collect and produce such
informnation  because  they make private  loans that are not traded, which  reduces free rider
3problems. In markets for other securities, like stocks, if some investors acquire information that
screens out which stocks are undervalued and then they buy these securities, other investors who
have not paid to discover this information may be able to buy right along with the well-informed
investors. If enough free-riding investors can do this and the price is bid up, then investors who
have collected information will earn less on the securities they purchase and will thus have less
incentive to collect this information. Once investors recognize that other investors in securities
can monitor and enforce restrictive covenants, they will also want  to free ride on the other
investors' monitoring and enforcement.  As a result, not enough resources will be devoted to
screening, monitoring  and enforcement.  But because  the loans  of banks are private,  other
investors cannot buy the loans directly, and free-riding on banks' restrictive covenants is much
trickier than simply following the buying patterns of others. As a result, investors are less able
to free ride off of financial institutions making private loans like banks, and since banks receive
the benefits of screening and monitoring they have an incentive to carry it out.
The special importance  of banks and other financial intermediaries  in the financial
system implies that if their ability to lend is impaired, overall lending will decline and the
economy will contract. A deterioration in the balance sheets of financial intermediaries indeed
hinders their ability to lend and is thus a key factor promoting financial crises.
If banks (and other financial intermediaries making loans) suffer a deterioration in their
balance sheets, and so have a substantial contraction in their capital, they have two choices:
either they can cut back on their lending; or they can try to raise new capital.  However, when
these institutions experience a deterioration in their balance sheets, it is very hard for them to
raise new capital at a reasonable cost.  Thus, the typical response of financial institutions with
weakened balance  sheets is a contraction in their lending, which  slows  economic activity.
Recent research suggests that weak balance sheets led to a capital  crunch which hindered
growth in the U.S. economy during the early 1990s (e.g., see Bernanke and Lown, 1991, Berger
and Udell, 1994, Hancock, Laing and Wilcox, 1995, and Peek and Rosengren,  1995, and the
symposium published in Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1993).
If the deterioration in bank balance sheets is severe enough, it can even lead to bank
panics, in which there are multiple, simultaneous failures of banking institutions.  Indeed, in the
absence of a government safety net, there is some risk that contagion can spread from one bank
failure to another,  causing even healthy banks to fail.  The source  of the contagion is again
asymmetric information.  In a panic, depositors, fearing the safety of their deposits and not
knowing the quality of the banks' loan portfolios, withdraw their deposits  from the banking
system, causing a contraction in loans and a multiple contraction in deposits, which then causes
other banks to fail. In turn, the failure of a bank means the loss of the information relationships
4in which that bank participated, and thus a direct loss in the amount of financial intermediation
that can be done by the banking sector.  The outcome is an even sharper decline in lending to
facilitate productive investments, with an additional resulting contraction in economic activity.
3.2 Increases in Interest Rates
Asymmetric information and the resulting adverse selection problem can lead to "credit
rationing," in which some borrowers are denied loans even when they are willing to pay a higher
interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss,  1981).  This occurs because  as interest rates rise, prudent
borrowers are more likely to decide that it would be unwise to borrow, while borrowers with
the riskiest investment projects are often those who are willing to pay the highest interest rates,
since if the high-risk investment succeeds, they will be the main beneficiaries.  In this setting,
a higher interest rate leads to even greater adverse selection; that is, the higher interest rate
increases the likelihood that the lender is lending to a bad credit risk. Thus, higher interest rates
can be one factor that helps precipitate financial instability, because lenders recognize that
higher interest rates mean a dilution in the quality of potential borrowers, and are likely to react
by taking a step back from their business of financial intermediation and limiting the number
of loans they make.
Increases in interest rates can also have a negative effect on bank balance sheets.  The
traditional banking business involves "borrowing short and lending long; " that is, taking deposits
which can be withdrawn on demand (or certificates of deposit that can be withdrawn in a matter
of months)  and making  loans that will be repaid  over periods  of years  or sometimes  even
decades. In short, the assets of a bank typically have longer duration assets than its liabilities.
Thus, a rise in interest rates directly causes a decline in net worth, because in present value
termns,  the interest-rate rise lowers the value of assets with their longer duration more than it
raises the value of liabilities with their shorter duration.
3.3 Increases in Uncertainty
A dramatic increase in uncertainty in financial markets makes it harder for lenders to
screen out good from bad credit risks. The lessened ability of lenders to solve adverse selection
and moral hazard problems renders them less willing to lend, leading to a decline in lending,
investment, and aggregate activity.  This increase in uncertainty can stem from a failure of a
prominent  financial  or  nonfinancial  institution,  or  from  a  recession,  but  of  even  more
5importance  in  emerging  market  countries  it can result  from  uncertainty  about the  future
direction of government policies.
3.4 Deterioration  of Nonfinancial  Balance  Sheets
The state of the balance sheet of nonfinancial firms is the most critical factor for the
severity of asymmetric information problems in the financial system.  If there is a widespread
deterioration of balance sheets among borrowers, it worsens both adverse selection and moral
hazard problems in financial markets, thus promoting financial instability. This problem can
arise in a variety of ways.
For example, lenders often use collateral as an important way of addressing asymmetric
information problems. Collateral reduces the consequences of adverse selection or moral hazard
because it reduces the lender's losses in the case of a default.  If a borrower defaults on a loan,
the lender can sell the collateral to make up for at least some of the losses on the loan. But if
asset prices in an economy fall, and the value of collateral falls as well, then the problems of
asymmetric information suddenly rear their heads.
Net worth can perform a similar role to collateral. If a firm has high net worth, then even
if it defaults on its debt pay,ments, the lender can take title to the firm's net worth, sell it off, and
use the proceeds to recoup some of the losses from the loan.  High net worth also directly
decreases the incentives for borrowers to commit moral hazard because borrowers now have
more at stake, and thus more to lose, if they default on their loans. The importance of net worth
explains why stock market crashes can cause financial instability. A sharp decline in the stock
market reduces  the market  valuation of a firms'  net worth,  and thus can increase  adverse
selection and  moral  hazard  problems  in  financial  markets  (Bernanke  and  Gertler,  1989;
Calomiris  and  Hubbard,  1990).  Since the stock market  decline  which  reduces net worth
increases incentives for borrowers to engage in moral hazard, and since lenders are now less
protected against the consequences of adverse selection because the value of net assets is worth
less, lending decreases and economic activity declines.
Increases in interest rates not only have a direct effect on increasing adverse selection
problems, as described earlier, but they may also promote financial instability through both
firms' and households' balance sheets.  A rise in interest rates will increased households' and
firms' interest payments,  decrease cash flow and thus cause a deterioration  in their balance
sheets, as pointed out in Bernanke and Gertler's (1995) excellent survey of the credit view of
monetary transmission. As a result, adverse selection and moral hazard problems become more
6severe for potential lenders to these firms and households, leading to a decline in lending and
economic activity.  There is thus an additional reason why sharp increases in interest rates can
be an important factor leading to financial instability.
Unexpected changes in the rate of inflation can also affect balance sheets of borrowers.
In economies in which inflation has been moderate for a long period of time, debt contracts with
long duration have interest payments fixed in nominal terms for a substantial  period of time.
When inflation turns out to be  less than anticipated, which  can occur either because of an
unanticipated disinflation as occurred in the United States in the early 1980s or by an outright
deflation as has occurred in Japan more recently, the value of firms' liabilities in real termns  rises,
and its net worth in real terms declines.  The reduction in net worth then increases the adverse
selection and moral hazard problems facing lenders, and reduces investment and economic
activity.
In emerging market economies, a decline in unanticipated inflation does not have the
unfavorable direct effect on firms' balance sheets that it has in industrialized  countries. Debt
contracts are of very short duration in many emerging market countries, and since the tenns of
debt contracts are continually repriced to reflect expectations of inflation, unexpected inflation
has little real effect. Thus, one mechanism that has played a role in industrialized countries to
promote financial instability has no role in many emerging market countries.
On the other hand, emerging market economies face at least one factor affecting balance
sheets that can be extremely important in precipitating financial instability that is not important
in most  industrialized  countries:  unanticipated  exchange  rate  depreciation  or  devaluation.
Because of uncertainty about the future value of the domestic  currency, many nonfinancial
firms, banks and governments in emerging market countries find it much easier to issue debt
if the debt is denominated in foreign currencies. With debt contracts denominated in foreign
currency, when there is an unanticipated depreciation or devaluation of the domestic currency,
the debtburden of domestic firms increases. Since assets are typically denominated in domestic
currency  and so do not increase  in value, there  is  a resulting  decline  in net worth.  This
deterioration in balance sheets then increases adverse selection and moral hazard problems,
which leads to financial instability and a sharp decline in investment and economic activity.
4.
Dynamics of Financial Crises
7Financial crises in emerging markets undergo several stages.  There is an initial stage
during which a deterioration  in financial and nonfinancial  balance sheets occur, and which
promotes  the second  stage, a currency  crisis.  The third stage is a further deterioration  of
financial and nonfinancial balance sheets that occurs as a result of the currency crisis, and this
stage is the one that tips the economy over into a full-fledged financial crisis with its devastating
consequences.
4.1 Initial Stage: Runup to the Currency Crisis
The first stage leading up to a financial crisis in emerging market countries has typically
been a financial liberalization, which involved lifting restrictions on both interest-rate ceilings
and the type of lending allowed and often privatization of the financial system.  As a result,
lending increased dramatically, fed by inflows of international capital.
Of course, the problem was not that lending expanded, but rather that it expanded so
rapidly that excessive risk-taking  was the result which led to an increase  in nonperforming
loans.  For example, In Mexico and the East Asian crisis countries, the estimated percentage of
loans that were nonperforming increased to over ten percent before the financial crisis struck
(Mishkin, 1  996a, Goldstein, 1998, and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1998), and these estimates
were probably grossly understated. This excessive risk-taking occurred for two reasons. First,
banks and other financial institutions lacked the well-trained  loan officers, risk-assessment
systems, and other management  expertise to evaluate and respond to risk appropriately. This
problem was made  even more severe by the rapid credit growth  in a lending boom which
stretched the resources  of the bank  supervisors who also failed to monitor these new loans
appropriately. Second, emerging market  countries such as Mexico, Ecuador,  the East Asian
crisis countries and Russia were notorious for weak financial regulation and supervision.  (In
contrast, the noncrisis  countries in east Asia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan had very
strong prudential supervision.) When financial liberalization yielded new opportunities to take
on risk, these weak regulatory/supervisory systems could not limit the moral hazard created by
the government safety net, and excessive risk-taking was one result. Even as government failed
in supervising financial institutions, it was effectively offering an implicit safety net that these
institutions would not be allowed to go broke, and thus reassuring depositors and foreign lenders
that they did not need to monitor these institutions, since there were likely to be government
bailouts to protect them.
It is important to note that banks were not the only source of excessive risk taking in
8financial systems of crisis countries.  In Thailand, finance companies, which were essentially
unregulated, were at the forefront of real estate lending and they were the first to get into
substantial difficulties before the 1997 crisis (Ito, 1998). In Korea, merchant banks, which were
primarily owned by the chaebols and were again virtually unregulated, expanded their lending
far more rapidly than the commercial banks and were extremely active in borrowing abroad in
foreign currency (Hahm and Mishkin, 2000).  Banks in these countries also expanded their
lending and engaged in excessive risk taking as a result of financial liberalization and weak
prudential supervision, but the fact that they received more scrutiny did put some restraints on
their behavior.
A dangerous  dynamic  emerged.  Once  financial liberalization  was adopted,  foreign
capital flew into banks and other financial intermediaries in these emerging market countries
because they paid high yields in order to attract funds to rapidly increase  their lending, and
because such investments were viewed as likely to be protected by a government  safety net,
either from the government of the emerging market country or from international agencies such
as the IMF.  The capital inflow problem was further stimulated by government  policies of
keeping exchange rates pegged to the dollar, which probably gave foreign investors a sense of
lower risk. In Mexico and East Asia capital inflows averaged was over 5 percent of GDP in the
three years leading up to the crises.  The private capital inflows led to increases in the banking
sector, especially in the emerging market countries in the Asian-Pacific region (Folkerts-Landau
et al., 1995). The capital inflows fueled a lending boom which led to excessive risk-taking on
the part of banks, which in turn led to huge loan losses and a subsequent deterioration of banks'
and other financial institutions' balance sheets.
The  inflow  of  foreign  capital,  particularly  short-term  capital,  was  often  actively
encouraged by governments. For example, the Korean government allowed chaebols to convert
finance  companies they owned into merchant banks which were  allowed to borrow freely
abroad as long as the debt was short-term.  A similar phenomenon occurred in Thailand which
allowed finance companies to borrow from foreigners.  The result was substantial increases in
foreign indebtedness  relative  to  the  country's  holding of  international  reserves:  Mexico,
Thailand, Korea and Indonesia all ended up with ratios of short-term foreign debt relative to
reserves exceeding 1.5. The high degree of illiquidity in these countries suggests that they were
vulnerable to a financial crisis (Radelet and Sachs, 1998).
This deterioration in financial sector balance sheets, by itself, might have been sufficient
to  drive  these  countries  into  a  financial  and  economic  crises.  As  explained  earlier,  a
deterioration in the balance sheets of financial firms can lead them at a minimum to restrict their
lending, or can even lead to a full-scale banking crisis which forces many banks into insolvency,
9thereby nearly removing the ability of the banking sector to make loans. The resulting credit
crunch can stagger an economy.
Another consequence of financial liberalization was a huge increase in leverage in the
corporate sector.  For example, in Korea debt relative to equity for the corporate sector as a
whole shot up to three hundred and fifty percent before the crisis, while it was over four hundred
percent  for the chaebols.  The  increase  in  corporate  leverage was  also very  dramatic  in
Indonesia where their corporations often borrowed directly abroad by issuing bonds, rather than
borrowing from banks.  This increase in corporate leverage  increased the vulnerability to a
financial crisis, because negative shocks would now be far more likely to tip corporations into
financial distress.
Stock market declines and increases in uncertainty were additional factors precipitating
the full-blown crises in Mexico, Thailand and South Korea.  (The stock market  declines in
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines occurred simultaneously with the onset of the crisis.)
The Mexican economy was hit by political shocks in 1994 that created uncertainty, specifically
the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the ruling party's presidential  candidate, and an
uprising in the southern state of Chiapas. By the middle of December  1994, stock prices on the
Bolsa (stock exchange)  had  fallen nearly  20 percent from  their September  1994 peak.  In
January 1997, a major Korean chaebol (conglomerate), Hanbo Steel, collapsed; it was the first
bankruptcy of a chaebol in a decade.  Shortly thereafter,  Sammi Steel and Kia Motors also
declared bankruptcy.  In Thailand, Samprosong Land, a major real estate developer, defaulted
on its foreign debt in early February 1997, and financial institutions that had lent heavily in the
real estate market began to encounter serious difficulties, requiring over $8 billion of loans from
the Tlhai central bank to prop them up.  Finally, in June, the failure of a major Thai finance
company, Finance One, imposed substantial  losses on both domestic  and foreign creditors.
These events increased  general uncertainty in the financial markets  of Thailand  and South
Korea, and both experienced substantial declines in their securities markets.  From peak values
in early 1996, Korean stock prices fell by 25 percent and Thai stock prices fell by 50 percent.
As we have seen, an increase in uncertainty and a decrease in net worth as a result of a
stock market decline increase asymnmetric  information problems.  It became harder to screen
out good from bad borrowers,  and the decline in net worth  decreased  the value  of firms'
collateral and increased their incentives to make risky investments because there is less equity
to lose if the investmnents  are unsuccessful.  The increase  in uncertainty  and  stock market
declines that occurred before the crisis, along with the deterioration in banks' balance sheets,
worsened adverse selection and moral hazard problems and made the economies  ripe for a
serious financial crisis.
104.2 Second Stage:  Currency  Crisis
The deterioration of financial and nonfinancial  sector balance sheets is a key factor
leading to the second stage, a currency crisis.  A weak banking system makes it less likely that
the central bank will take the steps to defend a domestic currency because if it raises rates, bank
balance sheets are likely to deteriorate further.  In addition, raising rates sharply increases the
cost of financing for highly leveraged corporations, which typically borrow short term, making
them more likely to experience financial distress.  Once investors recognize that a central bank
is less likely to take the steps to successfully defend its currency, expected profits from selling
the currency will rise and the incentives to attach the currency have risen. Also the recognition
that the financial sector may collapse and require a bailout that would produce substantial fiscal
deficits in the future also makes  it more likely that the currency will depreciate  (Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo 1998).
The weakened state of the financial and nonfinancial balance sheets along with the high
degree of illiquidity in Mexico and East Asian countries before the crisis, then set the stage for
their currency crises.  With these vulnerabilities, speculative attacks on the currency could have
been triggered by a variety of factors. In the Mexican case, the attacks came in the wake of
political instability in 1994 such as the assassination of political candidates and an uprising in
Chiapas. Even though the Mexican central bank intervened in the foreign exchange market and
raised interest rates sharply, it was unable to stem the attack and was forced to devalue the peso
on  December  20,  1994.  In Thailand,  the attacks  followed unsuccessful  attempts  of the
government  to  shore  up the financial  system,  culminating  in the  failure  of Finance  One.
Eventually,  the inability  of the central  bank  to defend the  currency  because  the required
measures would do too much harm to the weakened financial sector meant that the attacks could
not be resisted.  The outcome was therefore a collapse  of the Thai baht in early July  1997.
Subsequent speculative attacks on other Asian currencies led to devaluations and floats of the
Philippine peso and Malaysian ringgit in mid-July, the Indonesian rupiah in mid-August and the
Korean won in October.  By early 1998, the currencies of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia
and Korea had fallen by over 30 percent, with the Indonesian rupiah falling by over 75 percent.
114.3 Third  Stage: Currency  Crisis  to Full-Fledged  Financial  Crisis
Once a full-blown speculative  attack occurs and causes a currency depreciation, the
institutional structure of debt markets in emerging market countries --the short duration of debt
contracts  and  their denomination  in foreign currencies  -- now interacts with  the currency
devaluation to propel the economies into full-fledged financial crises.  These features of debt
contracts generate three mechanisms through which the currency crises increased asymmetric
information problems in credit markets, thereby causing a financial crisis to occur.
The first mechanism involves the direct effect of currency devaluation on the balance
sheets of firms. As discussed earlier, the devaluations in Mexico and East Asia increased the
debt burden of domestic firms which were denominated in foreign currencies. This mechanism
was particularly strong in Indonesia, the worst hit of all the crisis countries, which saw the value
of  its  currency  decline  by  over  75 percent,  thus increasing  the rupiah  value  of  foreign-
denominated debts by a factor of four. Even a healthy firm is likely to be driven into insolvency
by such a shock if it had a significant amount of foreign-denominated debt.
A second mechanism linking the financial crisis and the currency crisis arises because
the devaluation of the domestic currency led to further deterioration in the balance sheets of the
financial sector, provoking a large-scale banking crisis. In Mexico and the east Asian countries,
banks and many other financial institutions had many liabilities denominated in foreign currency
which increased sharply in value when a depreciation occurs.  On the other hand, the problems
of firms and households meant that they were unable to pay off their debts, also resulting in loan
losses on the assets side of financial institutions' balance sheets.  The result was that banks' and
other financial institutions' balance sheets were squeezed from both the assets and liabilities
side. Moreover, many of these institutions' foreign-currency denominated debt was very short-
term, so that the sharp increase in the value of this debt led to liquidity problems because this
debt needed to be paid back quickly.  The result of the further deterioration in banks' and other
financial  institutions' balance  sheets and their weakened  capital base  is that they cut back
lending. In the case of Indonesia, these forces were severe enough to cause a banking panic in
which numerous banks were forced to go out of business.
The third mechanism linking currency crises with financial crises in emerging market
countries is that the devaluation can lead to higher inflation.  The central bank in an emerging
market country may have little credibility as an inflation fighter. Thus, a sharp depreciation of
the currency after a speculative attack that leads to immediate upward pressure on import prices,
which can lead to a dramatic rise in both actual and expected inflation.  This is exactly what
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the currency crisis.  (Thailand, Malaysia  and South Korea avoided a large rise in inflation,
which partially explains their better performance relative to Indonesia.)  The rise in expected
inflation after the currency crises in Mexico and Indonesia led to a sharp rise in nominal interest
rates which,  given the short-duration  of debt, led to huge increases  in interest payments by
firms.  The outcome was a weakening of firms' cash flow position and further weakening their
balance sheets, which  then increased adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit
market.
All  three  of  these  mechanisms  indicate  that  the  currency  crisis  caused  a  sharp
deterioration  in both financial and non-financial  firm balance sheets  in the crisis countries,
which then translated to a contraction in lending and a severe economic downturn. Financial
markets  were  then no  longer  able to  channel  funds to those  with  productive  investment
opportunities, which led to devastating effects on the economies of these countries.
Note that the 1999 Brazilian crisis was not a financial crisis of the type described here.
Brazil experienced a classic balance of payments crisis of the type described in Krugman (1979)
in which concerns about unsustainable  fiscal policy led to a currency crisis.  The Brazilian
banking system was actually quite healthy before the crisis because it had undergone substantial
reform after a banking crisis in 1994 to 1996 (see Caprio and Klingbiel,  1999).  Furthermore,
Brazilian banks were adequately hedged against exchange rate risk before the devaluation in
1999 (Adams, et al,  1999).  As a result, the devaluation did not  trigger a  financial crisis,
although the high interest rates after the devaluation did lead to a recession.  The fact that Brazil
did not  experience  a  financial  crisis  explains  why  Brazil  fared  so much  better  after  its
devaluation than did Mexico or the East Asian crisis countries.
Russia's financial crisis in 1998 also had a strong fiscal component, but was actually a
symptom of widespread breakdown of structural reform and institution-building efforts (see
International  Monetary  Fund,  1999).  When  the debt moratorium/restructuring  and  ruble
devaluation was announced on August 17, Russian banks were subject to substantial losses on
$27 billion face value of government securities and increased liabilities from their foreign debt.
The  collapse  of  the  banking  system  and  the  negative  effects  on balance  sheets  on  the
nonfinancial sector from the collapse of the ruble then led to a financial crisis along the lines
outlined above.
135.
Financial Policies to Prevent Financial Crises
Now that we have developed a framework for understanding why financial crises occur,
we can look  at what  financial policies  can help prevent these crises  from  occurring.  We
examine twelve basic areas of financial reform: 1) prudential supervision, 2) accounting and
disclosure requirements, 3) legal and judicial systems, 4) market-based discipline, 5) entry of
foreign banks, 6) capital controls, 7) Reduction of the role of state-owned financial institutions,
8) restrictions on foreign-denominated debt, 9) elimination of too-big-to-fail in the corporate
sector, 10) sequencing financial liberalization,  11) monetary  policy and price stability,  12)
exchange rate regimes and foreign exchange reserves.
5.1 Prudential  Supervision
As we have seen, banks play a particularly important role in the financial systems of
emerging market counties and problems in the banking sector have been an important factor
promoting financial crises in recent years.  Deterioration in banks' balance sheets, which can
lead to banking crises, increase asymmetric  information problems which bring on financial
crises. Furthermore, problems in the banking sector make a foreign exchange crisis more likely,
which, by harming nonfinancial balance sheets, leads to a full blown financial crisis.  Because
banking panics have such potentially harmful effects, governments almost always provide an
extensive safety net for the banking system to prevent banking panics.  The downside of the
safety net is that it increases moral hazard incentives for excessive risk-taking on the part of the
banks which makes it more likely that financial crises will occur.  To prevent financial crises,
governments therefore need to pay particular attention to creating and sustaining a strong bank
regulatory/supervisory system to reduce excessive risk-taking in their financial systems.
Because the government safety net in emerging market countries has invariably been
extended to  other financial  intermediaries  -- for example  the Thai  central  bank  provided
liquidity assistance to insolvent finance companies -- these other financial institutions also have
strong incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking.  Indeed, deterioration in the balance sheets
of these financial institutions  played an important role in the financial  crises  in East Asia.
Effective  prudential  supervision  of these nonbank  financial  institutions  is  also  critical  to
promote financial stability.
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basic forms.
5.1.1. Prompt Corrective Action.  Quick action by prudential supervisors to stop undesirable
activities by financial institutions and, even more importantly, to close down institutions that
do not have sufficient  capital  is critical  if  financial crises  are to be  avoided.  Regulatory
forbearance which leaves insolvent institutions operating is disastrous because it dramatically
increases moral hazard incentives to take on excessive risk because an operating but insolvent
institution has almost nothing to lose by taking on colossal risks. If they get lucky and the risky
investments pay off, they get out of insolvency.  On the other hand, if, as is likely, the risky
investments  don't pay off, insolvent institutions' losses will mount, weakening the financial
system further and leading to higher taxpayer bailouts in the future. Indeed, this is exactly what
occurred in the savings and loan industry  in the United  States when insolvent  S&Ls were
allowed to operate during the 1980s and has been a feature of the situation in Mexico, East Asia
and Japan in the 1  990s.
An  important  way  to  ensure  that  bank  supervisors  do  not  engage  in  regulatory
forbearance is through implementation  of prompt corrective action provisions which require
supervisors to intervene  earlier and more vigorously  when a financial  institution gets into
trouble.  Prompt  corrective action is crucial to preventing  problems  in the financial  sector
because it creates incentives for institutions not to take on too much risk in the first place,
knowing that if they do so, they are more likely to be punished.
The outstanding example of prompt corrective action is the provision  in the FDICIA
(Federal  Deposit Insurance  Corporation Improvement  Act) legislation  implemented  in the
United States in 1991. Banks in the United States are classified into five groups based on bank
capital. Group 1, classified as "well capitalized," are banks that significantly exceed minimum
capital requirements and are allowed privileges such as insurance on brokered deposits and the
ability to  do  some  securities  underwriting.  Banks  in  group  2,  classified  as  "adequately
capitalized," meet minimum capital requirements and are not subject to corrective actions but
are  not  allowed  the  privileges  of  the  well-capitalized  banks.  Banks  in  group  3,
"undercapitalized,"  fail to meet risk-based  capital and leverage ratio requirements.  Banks in
groups  4  and  5  are  "significantly  undercapitalized"  and  "critically  undercapitalized,"
respectively, and are not allowed to pay interest on their deposits at rates that are higher than
average.  Regulators  still retain  a  fair  amount  of discretion  in  their  actions  to  deal  with
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asset  growth, requiring the election of a new board  of directors,  prohibiting  acceptance of
deposits from correspondent depository institutions, prohibiting capital distributions from any
controlling bank holding company, and termination of activities that pose excessive risk  or
divestiture of non-bank subsidiaries that pose excessive risk.'  On the other hand, FDICIA
mandates that regulators must require undercapitalized banks to submit an acceptable capital
restoration plan within 45 days and implement the plan. In addition, the regulatory  agencies
must take steps to close down critically undercapitalized banks (tangible equity capital less than
2% of assets) by putting them in receivership or conservatorship within ninety days, unless the
appropriate agency and the FDIC concur that other action would better achieve the purpose of
prompt corrective action.  If the bank continues to be critically undercapitalized  it must be
placed in receivership, unless specific statutory requirements are met.
A key element of making prompt corrective action work is that bank supervisors have
sufficient government funds to close down institutions when they become insolvent.  It is very
common  that politicians  and regulatory  authorities engage  in wishful thinking  when their
banking systems are in trouble, hoping that a large injection of public funds into the banking
system will be unnecessary. 2 The result is regulatory forbearance with insolvent institutions
allowed to keep operating which ends up producing disastrous consequences.  The Japanese
authorities have engaged in exactly this kind of behavior, but this was also  a feature of the
American response to the S&L crisis up until 1989.
Not only must weak institutions be closed down, but it must be done in the right way:
Funds must not be supplied to weak or insolvent banking institutions to keep them afloat.  To
do so will just be throwing  away good taxpayer money after bad.  In the long-run, injecting
public funds into weak banks does not deliver a restoration of the balance sheets of the banking
system because these weak banks continue to be weak and have strong moral hazard incentives
to  take on big  risks at the taxpayers'  expense.  This  is the lesson  learned  from the U.S.
experience in the 1980s as well as other countries more recently.  The way to recapitalize the
banking system is to close down all insolvent and weak institutions and sell off their assets to
healthy institutions with public funds used to make the assets whole.  If this is not possible, a
'See  Sprong (1994) for an a more detailed discussion  of the prompt corrective  action
provisions in FDICIA.
2In addition, banking institutions lobby often lobby vigorously to prevent the allocation of
public funds to close down insolvent institutions because this allows them to stay in business
and hopefully get  out of the hole.  This is exactly what happened in the United  States in the
1980s as is described in Mishkin (1998a).
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KAMCO in Korea, can be created which will have the responsibility  to sell off the assets of
these closed banks as promptly as possible, so that the assets can be quickly put to productive
uses by the private sector.
To prevent financial crises, it is also imperative that stockholders, managers and large
uninsured creditors be punished  when financial institutions are closed and public funds are
injected into the financial  system.  Protecting managers,  stockholders  and large uninsured
creditors from the consequences of excessive risk-taking increases the moral hazard problem
immensely and is thus highly dangerous although it is common.
5.1.2 Focus on Risk Management.  The traditional approach to bank supervision has focused
on the quality of the bank's balance sheet at a point in time and whether the bank complies with
capital requirements.  Although the traditional focus is important for reducing excessive risk-
taking by banks, it may no longer be adequate.  First is the point that capital may be extremely
hard to measure. Furthermore, in today's world, financial innovation has produced new markets
and instruments which make it easy for financial institutions and their employees to make huge
bets quickly. In this new financial environment, an institution that is quite healthy at a particular
point in time can be driven into insolvency extremely rapidly from trading losses, as has been
forcefully  demonstrated  by  the failure  of  Barings  in  1995 which,  although  initially  well
capitalized, was brought down by a rogue trader in a matter of months.  Thus an examination
which focuses only on a bank's or other financial institutions balance-sheet position at a point
in time may not be effective in indicating whether a bank will in fact be taking on excessive risk
in the near future.
For example, bank examiners in the United States are now placing far greater emphasis
on evaluating the soundness of bank's management processes with regard to controlling risk.
This shift in thinking was reflected in a new focus on risk management in the Federal Reserve
System's  1993 guidance  to examiners on trading and derivatives activities.  The focus was
expanded and formalized in the Trading Activities Manual issued early in 1994, which provided
bank examiners with tools to evaluate risk management  systems.  In late  1995, the Federal
Reserve and the Comptroller of the Currency announced that they would be assessing risk
management processes at the banks they supervise.  Now bank examiners give a separate risk
management rating from 1 to 5 which feeds into the overall management rating as part of the
CAMEL system.  Four elements of sound risk management  are assessed to come up with the
risk management rating:  1) The quality of oversight provided by the board of directors and
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significant risks, 3) the quality of the risk measurement  and monitoring  systems, and 4) the
adequacy  of  internal  controls  to  prevent  fraud  or  unauthorized  activities  on  the  part  of
employees.  Bank examiners get to see what best practice for risk management is like in the
banks they examine,  and they can then make sure that best practice  spreads throughout the
banking industry by giving poor rankings to banks that are not up to speed.
Bank supervision in countries outside the United States would also help promote a safer and
sounder  financial  sector  by  adopting  similar  measures  to  ensure  that  risk  management
procedures in their banks are equal to the best practice in financial institutions elsewhere in the
world.
5.1.3 Limiting Too-Big-To-Fail. Because the failure of a very large financial institution makes
it more likely that a major, systemic financial disruption will occur, supervisors are naturally
reluctant to allow a big financial institution to fail and cause losses to depositors.  The result is
that most countries either  explicitly or implicitly have a too-big-to-fail policy  in which  all
depositors at a big bank, both insured and uninsured are fully protected if the bank fails.  The
problem with the too-big-to-fail policy is that it reduces market discipline  on large financial
institutions and thus increases their moral hazard incentives to take on excessive risk.  This
problem is even more severe in emerging market countries because their financial systems are
typically smaller than industrialized countries and so tend to be dominated by fewer institutions.
Furthermore,  the  connections  with  the government  and  political  power  of large  financial
institutions is often much greater in emerging market countries, thus making it more likely that
they will be  bailed  out  if they  experience  difficulties.  Indeed,  not  only  have  uninsured
depositors been protected in many emerging market countries when large institutions have been
subject to failure, but other creditors and even equity holders have been also.
Limiting  moral  hazard  from having  financial  institutions  that  are too-big  or too-
politically-connected to fail is a critical problem for prudential supervision in emerging market
countries.  Thus, in order to reduce increased  incentives to take on excessive risk by  large
institutions, prudential supervisors need to scrutinize them even more rigorously than smaller
ones and  at  a minimum,  must  impose  losses  on shareholders  and  managers  when  these
institutions are insolvent.  However, supervisors still have to face the quandary of not wanting
to allow a failure  of a large financial institution to destabilize  the financial  system, while
keeping the moral hazard problem created by too-big-to-fail under control?
One proposal outlined in Mishkin (1 999) is for the supervisory agencies to announce that
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be  fully protected  unless this  is the cheapest way to resolve the failure.  It  is important to
recognize that although large banking institutions may be too big to liquidate, they can be closed
with losses imposed on uninsured creditors.  Indeed this is exactly what FDICIA  suggests
should be done by specifying that, except under very unusual circumstances when the a bank
failure poses "serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability", a least-cost
resolution procedure will be used to close down the bank.  Ambiguity is created about the use
of this systemic-risk exception to the least-cost-resolution rule because to invoke it requires a
two-thirds majority  of both the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve  System and the
directors of the FDIC, as well as the approval of the secretary of the Treasury.
An important concern is that the systemic-risk exception to least-cost resolution will
always be invoked when the failing bank is large enough because the government and central
bank be afraid to impose costs on depositors and other creditors when a potential financial crisis
is looming. Thus too-big-to-fail will still be alive, with all the negative consequences for moral-
hazard risk-taking by the largest institutions.  One way to cope with this problem is for the
authorities to announce that although they are concerned about systemic risk possibilities, there
will be a strong presumption that the first large bank to fail will not be treated as too-big-to-fail
and costs will be imposed  on uninsured depositors  and  creditors when the bank  is closed.
Rather than bail out the uninsured creditors at the initial large bank that fails, the authorities will
stand ready to extend the safety net to the rest of the banking system if they perceive that there
is a serious systemic risk problem.
The advantage of announcing such a stance is that uninsured depositors and creditors
now have to worry that if this bank is the first one to fail, they will not be bailed out.  As a result
these depositors and creditors will now have an incentive to withdraw their funds if they worry
about the soundness of the bank, even if it is very large, and this will alter the incentives of the
bank away from taking on too much risk.  Clearly, moral hazard still remains  in the system
because the authorities stand ready to extend the safety net to the rest of the system after the
initial large institution fails if its failure creates the potential for a banking crisis.  However, the
extent of moral hazard is greatly reduced by the use of this formn  of constructive ambiguity.
Furthermore, the cost of this remaining moral hazard must be balanced against the benefits of
preventing a banking crisis if the initial bank failure is likely to snowball into a systemic crisis.
5.1.4 Adequate Resources and Statutory  Authority for Prudential  Regulators/Supervisors.  In
many emerging market countries, prudential supervisors  are not given sufficient resources or
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banks) to do theirjobs effectively.  For example, in many emerging market countries, including
even middle income countries such as Argentina and the Philippines, supervisors are subject to
lawsuits for their actions and can be held personally liable. Their salaries are typically quite low
and  are a much  smaller relative  to private  sector salaries  than in industrialized  countries.
Without sufficient resources and incentives, not surprisingly supervisors will not monitor banks
sufficiently in order to keep them from engaging in inappropriately risky activities, to have the
appropriate management expertise and controls to manage risk, or to have sufficient capital so
that moral hazard incentives to take on excessive risk are kept in check.  Indeed, absence of
sufficient monitoring of banking institutions sufficiently not surprisingly has occurred in many
emerging  market  and  transition  countries  (Mexico,  Ecuador  and  East  Asia  being recent
examples),  but  it has  also  been  a very  serious problem  in  industrialized  countries.  The
resistance to providing the savings and loan supervisory agencies with adequate resources to
hire sufficient bank examiners by the U.S. Congress was a key factor in making the S&L crisis
in the United States in the 1  980s much worse. The inadequacy of bank supervision in Japan and
the problems it has caused are well-known, with the lack of resources  for bank supervision
exemplified by the fact that the number of bank examiners in Japan is on the order of 400 in
contrast to around 7,000 in the United States.
Giving supervisors sufficient resources and statutory authority to do their jobs is thus
critical to promoting a safe and sound financial system that is resistant to financial crises.  Ruth
Krivoy (2000), an ex-supervisor from Venezuela during its banking crisis, has put it very nicely
by saying that supervisors in emerging market countries must be given "respect".  If they are
paid poorly, the likelihood that they can be bribed either directly or through promises  of high
paying jobs by the institutions they supervise will be very high.  Making them personally liable
for taking  supervisory  actions also makes it less likely  that they will take the appropriate
actions. Furthermore,  if they  do not  have sufficient  resources,  particularly  in information
technology,  to monitor financial institutions, then they will be unable to spot excessive risk
taking.
5.1.5 Independence of Regulatory/Supervisory  Agencies. Because prompt corrective action is
so important, the bank regulatory/supervisory agency requires sufficient independence from the
political process so that it is not encouraged to sweep problems under the rug and engage in
regulatory forbearance.  One way to ensure against regulatory forbearance is to give the bank
supervisory role to a politically independent  central bank.  This has desirable  elements as
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task thrust upon them because they worry that it might increase the likelihood that the central
bank  would  be  politicized,  thereby  impinging  on the independence  of the  central bank.
Alternatively, bank supervisory activities could be housed in a bank regulatory authority that
is independent of the government.
Supervisory agencies will also not be sufficiently independent if they are starved for
resources.  If supervisory agencies have to come hat in hand to the government for resources
or funds to close down insolvent institutions, they will be more subject to political pressure to
engage in regulatory forbearance.  Supervisors must have adequate financial resources at their
finger tips to prevent this from occurring.
5.1.6 Accountability of Supervisors. An important impediment to successful supervision of the
financial system is that the relationship between taxpayers on the one hand and the supervisors
on the other creates a particular type of moral hazard problem, the principal-agent problem. The
principal-agent problem  occurs because  the agent (the supervisor)  does not have the same
incentives as the principal  (the taxpayer  they ultimately  work for) and  so act in their own
interest rather than in the interest of the principal.
To act in the taxpayer's  interest, regulators have several tasks, as we have seen. They
must  set restrictions  on holding  assets that  are too risky,  impose  sufficiently high  capital
requirements, and close down insolvent institutions.  However, because of the principal-agent
problem, supervisors have incentives to do the opposite and engage in regulatory forbearance.
One important incentive for supervisors that explains this phenomenon is their desire to escape
blame for poor performance by their agency. By loosening capital requirements and pursuing
regulatory forbearance, supervisors can hide the problem of an insolvent bank and hope that the
situation will improve, a behavior that Kane (1989) characterizes as "bureaucratic gambling".
Another important incentive for supervisors is that they may want to protect their careers by
acceding to pressures from the people who strongly influence their careers, the politicians.
Supervisors must be accountable if they engage in regulatory  forbearance in order to
improve incentives for them to do their job properly.  For example, as pointed out in Mishkin
(1997), an important but very often overlooked part of FDICIA which has helped make this
legislation  effective is that there is a mandatory report that the supervisory  agencies must
produce if the bank failure imposes costs on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
The resulting report is made available to any member  of Congress and to the general public
upon request, and the General Accounting Office must do an annual review of these reports.
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attractive to them, thereby reducing the principal-agent problem.  In addition, subjecting the
actions of bank supervisors to public scrutiny reduces the incentives of politicians to lean on
supervisors to relax their supervision of banks.
To get supervisors to do their jobs  properly, they must  also be  subject to  criminal
prosecution if they are caught taking bribes and must also be subject to censure and penalties
if they take jobs with institutions that they have supervised recently.  This entails a change in
culture for supervisors in many emerging market countries which allows them to get too close
to the institutions they supervise.
5.1.7  Restrictions on  Connected Lending. A particular  problem  in  the  financial  sector,
particularly  in emerging  market  countries,  is connected  lending,  lending  to  the  financial
institutions' owners or managers or their business associates. Financial institutions clearly have
less incentives to monitor loans to their owners or managers, thus increasing the moral hazard
incentives for the borrowers  to take on excessive risk, thereby  exposing  the institution to
potential loan losses. In addition, connected lending in which large loans are made to one party
can result in a lack of diversification for the institution, thus increasing the risk exposure of the
bank.
Prudential supervision to restrict connected lending are clearly necessary to reduce banks
risk exposure.  It can take several forms.  One is disclosure of connected lending.  Indeed, one
prominent feature of New Zealand's disclosure requirements is that the amount of lending to
connected persons is mandatory.  Another are limits on the amount of connected lending as a
share of bank capital.  Indeed, although New Zealand has gotten rid of much of the traditional
regulatory guidelines it still has chosen to have prudential limits on the amount of connected
lending.  Most countries have regulations  limiting connected  lending  and many emerging
market countries have stricter limits than in industrialized countries.  However, a key problem
in emerging  market  and transition  countries is that connected  lending limits  are often not
enforced effectively.  Folkerts-Landau, et al. (1995) have pointed out that bank examiners in
Asia were often unable to assess the exposure of banks to connected lending because of the use
of dummy accounts or the lack of authority for the examiners to trace where the funds are used.
Strong efforts to increase disclosure and increased authority for bank examiners to examine the
books of the banks to root out connected lending is crucial if this source of moral hazard is to
be kept under control.
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incentives for connected lending.  A prominent feature of the Korean financial crisis was that
the chaebols were allowed large ownership stakes in merchant banks, which  were virtually
unsupervised.  The merchant banks were then used as a conduit for greatly increasing the
chaebols leverage by supplying them with large amounts of funds by borrowing abroad and then
lending the proceeds to them.  The excessive risk taking by the merchant banks eventually
resulted in most of them becoming insolvent and was an important factor that led to the Korean
financial crisis (Hahm and Mishkin, 2000).  Preventing commercial enterprises from owning
financial institutions is crucial for promoting financial stability in emerging market countries.
5.2 Accounting Standards and Disclosure Requirements
Accounting standards and disclosure requirements for financial institutions, which are
often particularly lacking in emerging market and transition countries but also in a number of
industrialized countries (Japan being the most prominent example).  Without the appropriate
information, both markets  and supervisors will not be able to adequately  monitor financial
institutions to deter excessive risk-taking. 3 One prominent  example is that accounting and
supervisory conventions in many countries allow banks to make nonperforming loans look good
by lending additional money  to the troubled borrower who uses the proceeds  to make the
payments  on  the  nonperforming  loan,  thus  keeping  it  current,  a  practice  known  as
"evergreening".  The result is that nonperforming  loans are significantly understated  which
makes it harder for the markets to discipline financial institutions or for supervisors to decide
when banks are insolvent and need to be closed down.  Many countries also do not require the
reporting of key financial data by individual financial institutions, including their consolidated
financial  exposure,  which  makes  it hard  to  sort  out healthy  from  unhealthy  institutions.
Implementing proper accounting standards and disclosure requirements is an important first step
in promoting a healthy financial system. 4
3The importance of disclosure is illustrated in Garber and Lall (1996), which suggests that
off-balance-sheet and off-shore derivatives contracts were used by Mexican banks before the
Tequila crisis to get around regulations  that were intended to prevent them from taking on
foreign-exchange risk, and this played an important role in the Mexican crisis.
4See Goldstein and Turner (1996) and Goldstein (1997) for a further discussion of what steps
need to be taken to beef up accounting standards and disclosure requirements.
23An interesting example of an attempt to beef up disclosure requirements and raise their
prominence in prudential supervision is the system put in place in New Zealand in 1996 (see
Mortlock, 1996, and Nicholl, 1996). New Zealand scrapped its previous system of regular bank
examinations and replaced it with one based on disclosure requirements that uses the market to
police the behavior of the banks.  Every bank in New Zealand must supply a comprehensive,
quarterly financial statement that provides among other things, information on the quality of its
assets, capital adequacy, lending activities, profitability, and its ratings from private credit-rating
agencies and whether it has one.  These financial statements must be audited twice a year, and
not only must they be provided to the central bank, but they must also be made public, with a
two-page summary posted  in all bank branches.  In addition, bank directors  are required to
validate these statements and state publicly that their bank's risk management  systems are
adequate and being properly implemented.  A most unusual feature of this system is that bank
directors face unlimited liability if they are found to have made false or misleading statements.
The New Zealand example illustrates that disclosure requirements can be strengthened
appreciably.  However, suggesting that relying solely on disclosure requirements to police the
banking system is a workable model for other countries is going too far. Depositors are unlikely
to have the sophistication to understand fully the information provided and thus may not impose
the necessary discipline on the banks.  Furthermore, unlimited liability  for directors might
discourage top people from taking these positions, thereby weakening the management of the
banks.  Although disclosure requirements might be sufficient in New Zealand because almost
all  New  Zealand banks  are  foreign owned,  so  that bank  supervision  has  been  in  effect
outsourced  to the supervisors of the foreign banks that own the New Zealand  banks, it is
unlikely to work in countries where most of the banking system is domestically  owned.
5.3 Legal and Judicial Systems
The legal and judicial systems are very important for promoting the efficient functioning of the
financial system and the inadequacies of legal systems in many countries are a serious problem
for financial markets.  If property rights are unclear or hard to enforce, the process of financial
intermediation can be severely hampered.  Collateral can be an effective mechanism to reduce
adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets because it reduces the lender's
losses in the case of a default.  However,  in many developing  countries, the legal system
24prevents the use of certain assets as collateral or makes attaching collateral a costly and time-
consuming process,  thereby  reducing  the  effectiveness  of collateral  to  solve  asymmetric
information problems (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, 1996). Similarly, bankruptcy procedures
in developing countries  are frequently very cumbersome (or even nonexistent), resulting  in
lengthy delays in resolving conflicting claims.  Resolution of bankruptcies in which the books
of insolvent firms are opened up and assets are redistributed can be viewed as a process to
decrease  asymmetric  information  in  the  marketplace.  Furthermore,  slow  resolution  of
bankruptcies can delay recovery from a financial crisis because only when bankruptcies have
been resolved is there enough information in the financial system to restore it to a healthy
operation.
5.4 Encouraging Market-Based Discipline
There are two problems with relying on supervisors to control risk-taking by financial
institutions.  First, financial institutions have incentives to keep information away from bank
examiners  so that  they are not  restricted in  their activities.  Thus even  if supervisors  are
conscientious, they may not be  able to  stop institutions from  engaging  in risky  activities.
Second, is that because of the principal-agent problem, supervisors may engage in regulatory
forbearance and not do their jobs properly.
An answer to these problems is to have the market discipline financial institutions if they
are taking on too much risk. We have already mentioned that disclosure requirements can help
provide information to the markets which may help them monitor financial institutions and keep
them from taking on too much risk.  Two additional steps may help increase market discipline.
One is to require that financial institutions have credit ratings.  As part of the BASIC (which
stands for bonds, auditing, supervision,  information and credit ratings) supervisory  system
implemented in Argentina in December 1996 is the requirement that every bank have an annual
rating provided by a rating agency registered with the central bank. 5 Institutions with more than
$50 million in assets are required to have ratings from two rating agencies.  As part of this
scheme, the Argentinean central bank is responsible for performing an after the fact review of
the credit ratings to check if the rating agencies are doing a reasonable job.  As of January 1998,
these credit ratings must be published on billboards in the banks and these ratings must also
appear on all deposit certificates and all other publications related to obtaining funds from the
'See Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (1997) and Calomiris (1998) for a description
of the Argentine BASIC system.
25public.  As part of New Zealand's disclosure requirements, all banks must prominently display
their credit ratings on their long-term senior unsecured liabilities payable in New Zealand, or
alternatively, indicate if they do not have a credit rating.  Clearly, the lack of a credit rating or
a poor credit rating is expected to cause depositors and other creditors to be reluctant to put their
funds in the bank, thus giving the bank incentives to reduce its risk taking and boost its credit
rating.  This has a higher likelihood of working in Argentina and New Zealand because both
countries do not have government deposit insurance.
Another  way  to  impose  market  discipline  on  banks  is  to  require  that  they  issue
subordinated  debt (uninsured  debt that is junior  to insured  deposits,  but  senior to  equity).
Subordinated debt, particularly if it has a ceiling on its the spread between its interest rate and
that on government securities, can be an effective disciplining device.  If the bank is exposed
to too much risk, it is unlikely to be able to sell its subordinated debt.  Thus, compliance with
the subordinated  debt requirement will be a direct way for the market to force banks to limit
their risk exposure.  Alternatively, deposit insurance premiums could be charged according to
the interest rate on the subordinated debt.  Not only would the issuance of subordinated debt
directly help reduce incentives for banks to engage in risky activities, but it can also provide
supplemental information to bank examiners that can help them in their supervisory activities.
In addition, information about whether banks are successful in issuing subordinated debt and
the interest rate  on this debt  can help the public evaluate  whether  supervisors  are being
sufficiently tough on a particular banking institution, thus reducing the scope of the principal-
agent problem.
Argentina  has implemented a subordinated debt requirement  in its BASIC program,
although without an interest rate  cap, which took  effect on January  1998.  As reported  in
Calomiris  (1998),  initially  about  half  of  the banks  have  been  able  to  comply  with  this
requirement.  Interestingly, as expected, it is the weakest banks that have had trouble issuing
subordinated debt.  Furthermore, banks that complied with the requirement had lower deposit
rates and larger growth in deposits. Thus, the subordinated debt requirement looks like it has
had the intended effect of promoting discipline on the banks (Calomiris and Powell, 2000).
5.5  Entry of Foreign Banks
Many countries have restrictions  on the entry of foreign banks.  Rather than seeing
foreign banks as a threat, their entry should be seen as an opportunity to strengthen the banking
system.  In all but a few large countries, domestic banks are unable to diversify because their
26lending is concentrated in the home country. In contrast, foreign banks have more diversified
portfolios and also usually have access to sources of funds from all over the world through their
parent company.  This diversification means that these foreign banks are exposed to less risk
and  are less affected by negative  shocks to the home country's  economy.  Because  many
emerging  market  and transition  economies  are more volatile than industrialized  countries,
having a large foreign component to the banking sector is especially valuable because it helps
insulate the banking system from domestic shocks. Encouraging entry of foreign banks is thus
likely to lead to a banking and financial system that is substantially less fragile and far less
prone to crisis.
Another  reason  for encouraging  entry  of foreign banks  is  that  this  can encourage
adoption of best practice in the banking industry.  Foreign banks come with expertise in areas
like risk management.  As mentioned earlier, when bank examiners in a country see better
practices in risk management, they can spread these practices throughout their country's banking
system by downgrading banks who do not adopt these practices.  Having  foreign banks to
demonstrate the latest risk management techniques can thus lead to improved control of risk in
the home  country's  banking  system.  Clearly,  there  are  also  benefits  from  the  increased
competition that foreign bank entry brings to the banking industry in the home country. Entry
of foreign banks  will also lead to improved  management  techniques  and  a more  efficient
banking system.
Encouraging entry of foreign banks makes it also more likely that uninsured depositors
and other creditors of banks will not be bailed out.  Governments are far less likely to bail out
the banking sector when it gets into trouble if many of the banks are foreign owned because it
will be politically unpopular.  Thus uninsured depositors and other creditors will have greater
incentives to monitor the banks and pull out funds if these institutions take on too much risk.
The resulting increase in market discipline is therefore more likely to encourage more prudent
behavior by banking institutions.
5.6 Capital Controls
In the aftermath of the recent financial crises in Mexico and East Asia, in which the crisis
countries experienced large capital inflows before the crisis and large capital outflows after the
crisis, much attention has been focused on whether international capital movements are a major
source of financial instability.  The asymmetric information analysis of the crisis suggests that
international capital movements can have an important role in producing financial instability,
27but as we have seen this is because the presence of a government safety net with inadequate
supervision of banking institutions encourages capital inflows which lead to a lending boom and
excessive risk-taking on the part of banks. 6 Consistent with this view, Gavin and Hausman
(1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) do find that lending booms are a predictor of banking
crises, yet it is by no means clear that capital inflows will produce a lending boom which causes
a  deterioration  in  bank  balance  sheets.  Indeed, Kaminsky  and  Reinhart  (1999)  find  that
financial liberalization, rather than balance of payments developments inflows, appears to be
a more important predictor of banking crises.
Capital outflows have also been pointed to as a source of foreign exchange crises, which
as we have seen, can promote financial instability in emerging market countries.  In this view,
foreigners pull their capital out of country and the resulting capital outflow  is what forces a
country to devalue its currency. However, as pointed out earlier, a key factor leading to foreign
exchange crises are problems in the financial sector which lead to the speculative attack and
capital outflows.  With this view, the  capital outflow which is associated  with the foreign
exchange crisis is a symptom of underlying fundamental problems rather than a cause of the
currency crisis.  The consensus from many empirical studies  [see the excellent survey in
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997)] provides support for this view because capital flow
or current account measures  do not have predictive  power in forecasting  foreign exchange
crises,  while  a deeper  fundamental  such as problems  in  the banking  sector  helps predict
currency crises.
The analysis here therefore  does not provide a case for capital controls such as the
exchange controls that have recently been adopted in Malaysia.  Exchange  controls are like
throwing out the baby with the bath water.  Capital controls have the undesirable feature that
they may block funds from entering a country which will be used for productive investment
opportunities.  Although these controls may limit the fuel supplied to lending booms through
capital flows, over time they produce substantial distortions and misallocation of resources as
households and  businesses try  to get around them.  Indeed, there are serious  doubts as to
whether capital controls can be effective in today's  environment in which trade is open and
where there are many financial instruments that make it easier to get around these controls.
On the other hand, there is a strong case to improve bank regulation and supervision so
that capital inflows are less likely to produce a lending boom  and excessive risk taking by
banking institutions.  For example, banks might be restricted in how fast their borrowing could
grow and this might have the impact of substantially limiting capital inflows.  These prudential
6See Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1994) for a model of this process.
28controls could be thought of as a form of capital controls, but they are quite different than the
typical exchange  controls.  They focus on the sources of financial  fragility, rather than the
symptoms, and supervisory controls of this type can enhance the efficiency of the financial
system rather than hampering it.
5.7  Reduction of the Role of State-Owned Financial Institutions
A feature of many countries' financial systems, particularly  in emerging market and
transition  countries, is government  interventions  to direct credit  either to themselves  or to
favored sectors or individuals in the economy.  Governments either do this by setting interest
rates at artificially  low levels  for certain types  of loans, by  creating development  finance
institutions to make specific types of loans, by setting up state-owned banks that can provide
funds to favored entities, or by directing private institutions to lend to certain entities. Private
institutions clearly have an incentive to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems and
lend to borrowers who have productive  investment opportunities.  Governments  have less
incentive to do so because they are not driven by the profit motive and so their directed credit
programs or state-owned banks are less likely to channel funds to those borrowers who will help
produce high growth ofthe economy. This type of government intervention in the credit markets
is therefore likely to be result in less efficient investment and slower growth.  Curtailing this
government  activity  is  therefore  important  for  promoting  economic  growth  (Caprio  and
Honohan, 2000).
The absence of a profit motive also means that state-owned banks are less likely to
manage risk properly and be efficient. Thus it is not surprising that state-owned banks usually
end up having larger loan loss ratios than private institutions,  and countries with the highest
share of state-owned  banks, on average, are also the ones with a higher percentage of non-
performing loans  and higher operating costs (Goldstein and Turner,  1996, and Caprio and
Honohan, 2000). Thus the presence of state-owned banks can substantially weaken the banking
system.  The inefficiency of state-owned banks and their higher loan losses strongly argue for
privatization of the banking sector. However, even privatization must be managed properly or
it can lead to disaster.  If purchasers of banks are those who are likely to engage in excessive
risk taking or even fraud, the possibility that banking problems will arise in the future are high.
Also if purchasers of banks are allowed to put in very little of their own capital into the bank,
they may also have strong incentives to engage in risky activities at the depositors and taxpayers
29expense.  These potential  downsides  of privatization do not  indicate  that privatization  be
avoided, but rather that the chartering or licensing process be sufficiently stringent to screen out
bad owners, making sure that bank ownership goes to  individuals who will improve bank
performance over the previous government managers.
5.8  Restrictions on Foreign-Denominated  Debt
The asymmetric information view of financial crises indicates that a debt structure with
substantial foreign-denominated debt, as is typical in many emerging market countries, makes
the financial system more fragile.  Currency crises and devaluations do trigger full-fledged
financial  crises in  countries with  foreign-denominated debt, while  this  is not the case for
countries whose debt is denominated in domestic currency.
The presence of foreign-denominated debt also makes if far more difficult for a country
to recover from a financial crisis.  Industrialized countries with debt denominated in domestic
currency can promote recovery by pursuing expansionary monetary policy by injecting liquidity
(reserves) into the financial system.  Injecting reserves, either through open market operations
or by lending to the banking sector, causes the money supply to increase, which in turns leads
to a higher price level.  Given that debt contracts are denominated in domestic  currency and
many debt contracts and are often of fairly long duration, the reflation of the economy causes
the debt burden of households and firms to fall, thereby increasing their net worth. As outlined
earlier, higher net worth then leads to reduced adverse selection and moral hazard problems in
financial markets, undoing the increase in adverse selection and moral hazardproblems  induced
by the financial crisis.  In addition, injecting liquidity into the economy raises asset prices such
as land and stock market values, which also cause an improvement in net worth and a reduction
in adverse selection and moral hazard problems.  Also, as discussed  in Mishkin (1996b),
expansionary  monetary  policy  promotes  economic  recovery  through  other  mechanisms
involving the stock market and the foreign exchange market.
A second method for a central bank to promote recovery  from a financial crisis is to
pursue the so-called lender-of-last-resort role in which the central bank stands ready to lend
freely during a financial crisis.  By restoring liquidity to the financial sector, the lender of last
resort can help shore up the balance sheets of financial firms, thereby preventing  a systemic
shock from spreading and bringing down the financial system.  There are many instances of
successful lender of last resort operations in industrialized countries (e.g., see Mishkin, 1991);
the Federal Reserve's  intervention on the day after the October 19, 1987 stock market crash is
30one example. Indeed, what is striking about this episode is that the extremely quick intervention
of the Fed resulted not only in a negligible impact on the economy of the stock market crash,
but also meant that the amount of liquidity that the Fed needed to supply to the economy was
not very large (see Mishkin (1991).
However, if the financial system has a large amount of foreign-denominated debt it may
be far more difficult for the central bank to promote recovery from a financial crisis.  With this
debt structure, a central bank can no longer use expansionary monetary  policy to promote
recovery from a financial crisis.  Suppose that the policy prescription for countries with little
foreign-denominated debt, that is expansionary monetary policy and reflation of the economy,
were followed in an emerging market country with a large amount of foreign-denominated debt.
In this case the expansionary  monetary  policy is likely to cause the domestic  currency to
depreciate sharply. As we have seen before, the depreciation of the domestic currency leads to
a deterioration in firms' and banks' balance sheets because much of their debt is denominated
in foreign currency, thus raising the burden of indebtedness and lowering banks' and firms' net
worth.
The net result of an expansionary monetary policy in an emerging market country with
a large amount of foreign-denominated debt is that it hurts the balance sheets of households,
firms, and banks.  Thus, expansionary monetary policy has the opposite result to that found in
industrialized countries after a financial crisis:  it causes a deterioration in balance sheets and
therefore amplifies adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets caused
by a financial crisis, rather than ameliorates them as in the industrialized country case.
For similar reasons,  lender-of-last-resort  activities  by a central bank  in a emerging
markets country with substantial foreign-denominated debt, may not be as successful as in a
industrialized country.  Central bank lending to the financial system in the wake of a financial
crisis which expands domestic credit might lead to a substantial depreciation of the domestic
currency, with the result that balance sheets will deteriorate making recovery from the financial
crisis less likely.  The use of the lender-of-last-resort role by a central bank is therefore much
trickier in countries with a large amount of foreign-denominated debt because central bank
lending is now a two-edged sword.
The above arguments suggest that the economy would be  far less prone to financial
crises and  could recover  far more easily if the issuance of  foreign-denominated  debt was
discouraged.  Because much foreign-denominated debt is intermediated through the banking
system, regulations  to both restrict bank  lending and borrowing in foreign currencies could
greatly enhance financial stability.  Similarly, restrictions  on corporate borrowing in foreign
currency or tax policies to discourage foreign-currency borrowing could help make the economy
31better able to withstand a currency depreciation without undergoing a financial crisis.  Krueger
(2000)  has  also  suggested  that  restrictions  should be  placed  on  financial  institutions  in
industrialized  countries to  limit lending to emerging  market  countries  using industrialized
country currencies.
5.9 Elimination of Too-Big-To-Fail in the Corporate Sector
We have already discussed why a too-big-to-fail policy leads to increased risk taking by
financial institutions.  The same incentives clearly apply to corporations if they are considered
to be too-big-to-fail (or too-politically-influential) by the government.  Lenders, knowing that
they are unlikely to be subjected to losses if the corporation gets into trouble, will not monitor
the corporation and withdraw funds if it is taking on excessive risk.  In many emerging market
countries, governments have propped up large and politically-connected corporations when they
suffer financial distress and this has been a source of increased risk taking by these companies,
especially when they face difficult times.  For example, as pointed out in Hahm and Mishkin
(2000), the Korean government was perceived to have a too-big-to-fail policy for the chaebols
whose profitability dropped in the 1990s.  Given the resulting lack of market discipline, they
proceeded to try to grow out of their problems by borrowing, frequently in foreign currency, and
dramatically increasing  their  leverage.  This increase  in risk taking then was a key  factor
generating the financial crisis in Korea.
To contain incentives for the corporate sector to increase leverage and take on too much
risk that leaves them extremely vulnerable to adverse shocks, it is imperative that too-big-to-fail
policies be eliminated.  This implies a greater separation between the corporate sector and the
government, something that also requires a change in business culture in many emerging market
countries.
5.10 Sequencing Financial Liberalization
Deregulation and liberalization of the financial system have swept through almost all
countries  in  recent  years.  Although  deregulation  and  liberalization  are  highly  desirable
objectives, the analysis of financial crises in this paper indicates that if this  process is not
managed properly, it can be disastrous.  If the proper bank regulatory/supervisory  structure,
32accounting and disclosure requirements, restrictions on connected lending, and well-functioning
legal and judicial systems are not in place when liberalization comes, the appropriate constraints
on risk-taking behavior will be far too weak.  The result will be that bad loans are likely, with
potentially disastrous consequences for bank balance sheets at some point in the future.
In addition, before liberalization occurs, banks may not have the expertise to make loans
wisely, and so opening them up to new lending opportunities may also lead to poor quality of
the loan portfolio.  We have also seen that financial deregulation and liberalization often lead
to a lending boom, because  of both increased  opportunities for bank lending and financial
deepening in which more funds flow into the banking system.  Although financial deepening
is a positive development for the economy in the long run, in the short run the lending boom
may outstrip the available information resources in the financial system, helping to promote a
financial collapse in the future.
The dangers in financial deregulation  and liberalization  do not imply that countries
would  be  better  off by  not  pursuing  a liberalization  strategy.  To  the  contrary,  financial
liberalization is critical to the efficient functioning of financial markets so that they can channel
fimds to those with the most productive investment opportunities.  Getting funds to those with
the most productive investment opportunities is especially critical to emerging market countries
because these investments can have especially high returns, thereby stimulating rapid economic
growth.  However, proper sequencing of financial deregulation and liberalization is critical to
its success.  It is important that policymakers put in place the proper institutional  structure
before liberalizing their financial systems, especially if there are no restrictions  on financial
institutions seeking funds abroad or issuing foreign-denominated debt. Before financial markets
are fully liberalized, it is crucial that the precepts outlined above be implemented: provision of
sufficient resources and statutory authority to bank supervisors, adoption of prompt corrective
action  provisions,  an  appropriate  focus  on  risk  management,  independence  of  bank
regulators/supervisors  from  short-run  political  pressure,  increased  accountability  of  bank
supervisors, limitations  on too-big-to-fail,  adoption of adequate  accounting  standards  and
disclosure requirements, sufficient restrictions on connected lending, improvements in the legal
and judicial systems, encouragement of market-based discipline, and encouragement of entry
of foreign banks.
Because the above measures are not easy to install quickly and because of the stresses
that rapid expansion of the financial sector puts on both managerial and supervisory resources,
restricting the growth of credit when financial liberalization  is put into place makes a lot of
sense.  This can take the form of putting upper limits on loan-to-value ratios, or for consumer
credit, setting maximum repayment periods and minimum downpayment percentages.  Banks
33could also be restricted in how fast certain types of their loan portfolios are allowed to grow.
In addition, at the beginning of the liberalization process, restrictions on foreign-denominated
debt and prudential controls that might limit capital inflows may be necessary to reduce the
vulnerability of the financial system.  As the appropriate infrastructure is put into place, these
restrictions then can be reduced.  The bottom line is that, although eventually a full financial
liberalization is a worthy goal, to avoid financial crises financial liberalization needs to proceed
at a measured pace, with some restrictions imposed along the way.
5.11 Monetary Policy and Price Stability
Although,  only  indirectly  a  financial policy,  it  is also  important  to  recognize  that
monetary policy can play an important role in promoting financial stability.  Price stability is
a worthy goal in its own right.  Not only do public opinion surveys indicate that the public is
very hostile to inflation, but there is also mounting evidence from econometric  studies that
inflation is harmful to the economy. 7
The asymmetric information analysis of financial crises provides additional reasons why
price stability is so important.  As was mentioned earlier, when countries have a past history of
high inflation, debt contracts are often denominated in foreign currencies.  As we have seen, this
feature of debt contracts makes the financial system more fragile because currency depreciation
can trigger a financial crisis.  Achieving price stability is a necessary condition  for having a
sound currency and with a sound currency, it is far easier for banks, nonfinancial firms and the
government to raise capital with debt denominated in domestic currency.  Thus another method
for reducing an economy's dependence on foreign-denominated debt and enhancing financial
stability is the successful pursuit of price stability.
Furthermore,  central  banks  which  have  successfully  pursued  price  stability  have
sufficient credibility so that expansionary monetary policy or a lender-of-last-resort operation
in the face of a financial crisis is less likely to result in a rise in inflation expectations and a
sharp depreciation  of the currency which would harm balance sheets.  Thus countries which
have successfully pursued price stability have an enhanced ability to use monetary policy tools
to promote recovery from a financial crisis.
7Inflation, particularly at high levels, is found to be negatively associated with growth.  At
lower levels, inflation is found to lower the level of economic activity, although not necessarily
the growth rate. See the survey in Anderson and Gruen (1995) and Fischer (1993), one of the
most cited papers in this literature.
345.12 Exchange Rate Regimes and Foreign Exchange Reserves
Although we have seen that the pursuit of price stability can enhance financial stability
and is thus desirable,  some methods of pursuing price stability  can unfortunately promote
financial instability. One commonly used method to achieve price stability is to peg the value
of its currency to that of a large, low-inflation country.  In some cases, this strategy involves
pegging the exchange rate at a fixed value to that of the other country's currency so that its
inflation rate will eventually gravitate to that of the other country. In other cases, a currency the
strategy  involves a  crawling peg  or  target  in which  one  country's  currency  is allowed  to
depreciate at a steady rate against that of another country so that its inflation rate can be higher
than that of the country to which it is pegged.
Although  adhering  to a fixed  or pegged exchange  rate regime  can be a successful
strategy for controlling inflation, the analysis of financial crises in this paper illustrates how
dangerous this strategy can be for an emerging market country with a large amount of foreign-
denominated debt. Under a pegged exchange-rate regime, when a successful speculative attack
occurs, the decline in the value of the domestic currency is usually much larger, more rapid and
more unanticipated than when a depreciation occurs under a floating exchange-rate regime. For
example, during the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995, the value of the peso fell by half in only a few
months time, while in the recent Southeast Asian crisis, the worst-hit country Indonesia saw
seen its currency decline to less than one-quarter of its pre-crisis value, also in a very short
period of time.  The damage to balance sheets after these devaluations was extremely severe.
In Mexico, there was a several-fold increase in the net debtor position of business enterprises
from before the devaluation in December  1994 till March  1995, while in Indonesia the over
four-fold increase in the value of foreign debt arising from the currency collapse made it very
difficult for Indonesian firms with appreciable foreign debt to remain solvent. The deterioration
of nonfinancial firms' balance sheets leads to a deterioration in bank balance sheets because
borrowers from the banks are now less likely to be able to pay off their loans.  The result of this
collapse in balance sheets were sharp economic contractions.  In Mexico, real GDP growth in
the  second  and  third  quarters  of  1995 fell to  rates  around  -10  percent,  while  Indonesia
experience an even worse rate of decline, with GDP falling by close to fifteen percent in 1998,
and an economy still in shambles.
Another potential danger from an exchange-rate peg is that by providing a more stable
value  of the currency, it might lower risk for foreign investors  and thus encourage  capital
inflows.  Although these capital inflows might be channeled into productive  investments and
35thus stimulate growth, they might promote excessive lending, manifested by a lending boom,
because domestic financial intermediaries such as banks play a key role in intermediating these
capital inflows [Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1994)].  Indeed, Folkerts-Landau, et. al (1995)
found that emerging market countries in the Asian-Pacific region with the large net private
capital inflows also experienced large increases in their banking sectors.  Furthermore, if the
bank supervisory process is weak, as it often is in emerging market and transition countries, so
that the government  safety net for banking institutions creates incentives for them to take on
risk, the likelihood that a capital inflow will produce a lending boom is that much greater.  With
inadequate bank supervision, the likely outcome of a lending boom is substantial loan losses and
a deterioration of bank balance sheets and a possible financial crisis. 8
A flexible exchange rate regime has the advantage that movements in the exchange rate
are much less nonlinear than in a pegged exchange rate regime.  Indeed, the daily fluctuations
in the exchange rate in a flexible exchange rate regime have the advantage of making clear to
private firms, banks, and governments that there is substantial risk involved in issuing liabilities
denominated in foreign currencies.  Furthermore, a depreciation  of the exchange rate may
provide an early warning signal to policymakers that their policies may have to be adjusted in
order to limit the potential for a financial crisis.
The conclusion is that a pegged exchange rate regime may increase financial instability
in emerging market countries. However, this conclusion does not indicate that fixing or pegging
an exchange rate to control inflation  is always inappropriate.  Indeed, countries with a past
history  of poor inflation performance  may find that  only with  a  very  strong  commitment
mechanism to an exchange rate peg (as in a currency board or full dollarization) can inflation
be controlled (Mishkin, 1998b, and Mishkin and Savastano, 2000). However, the analysis does
suggest that countries using this strategy to control inflation must actively pursue policies that
will promote a healthy banking system. Furthermore, if a country has an institutional structure
of a fragile banking system and substantial debt denominated in foreign currencies,  using an
exchange rate peg, particularly one with a weak commitment mechanism, to control inflation
can be a very dangerous strategy indeed. 9 This is one reason why countries like Korea which
8Gavin and Hausman (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) do find that lending booms
are a predictor of banking crises, yet it is less clear that capital inflows will produce a lending
boom which causes a deterioration in bank balance sheets.  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), for
example,  find that  financial  liberalization,  rather  than balance  of payments  developments
inflows, appears to be a more important predictor of banking crises.
9See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) for additional arguments as to why pegged exchange rate
regimes may be undesirable.
36in the past year have de facto pegged their exchange rate by only allowing it to fluctuate within
very narrow bounds may be leaving themselves more exposed to future financial crises than
they realize.
Another feature of recent currency/financial crises is that countries with low amounts
of international reserves relative to short-term foreign liabilities seemed to be more vulnerable
to crises.  This has led some researchers (e.g. Radelet and Sachs, 1998) to advocate increased
holdings of international reserves to insulate countries from financial crises.  Indeed, many
emerging market  countries have taken this recommendation to heart  by accumulating large
amount of reserves after their financial crises.  For example, Korea currently has accumulated
international reserves near the $100 billion level.  Although accumulation of large amounts of
international reserves may make emerging market countries less vulnerable to currency crises,
they are unlikely to insulate them from a fmancial crisis if the financial sector is sufficiently
weakened.  Large accumulation of international reserves has the potential to lull an emerging
market country into complacency about taking the steps to ensure a safe and sound financial
system and thus could have a hidden danger.
6.
Concluding Remarks
The bad news is that in recent years, we have seen a growing number of banking and
financial crises in emerging market countries, with great costs to their economies.  The good
news, however, is that we now have a much better understanding of why banking and financial
crises occur in emerging market countries and so have a better idea of how these crises can be
prevented.  This paper has outlined a set of financial policies that can help in make financial
crises less likely.  If the political  will to adopt these policies  in emerging market  countries
grows, then we should see healthier financial systems in the these countries in the future, with
substantial gains both from higher economic growth and smaller economic fluctuations.
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